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The general aim of this article is to sound opposition against the instrumentalisation of art, that is, the harnessing of works of art to specific political, social and theoretical agendas, be they 
‘good’ or ‘bad’. My hypothesis is that the true ethical importance of 
a certain calibre of artwork lies not in the ‘messages’ that could be 
extracted from it, but in the autonomy and singularity that makes it 
‘stand on its own’ through nothing but its own internal conceptual 
complexity and formal cohesion. The latter would be qualities that 
render it ‘different’ and resistant to simplification and that guarantee 
its reception as an ever open ‘event’. The anti-instrumentalist argument 
will be offered in a historical context where art is always already implicitly 
and systematically hyper-instrumentalised, or commodified in the 
capitalist consumer society. The anti-instrumentalist argument is, 
therefore, also an oppositional or counter-hegemonic gesture arising 
from the assumption that something like ‘counter-culture’ could still 
at least be desirable.
I offer my arguments more specifically in response to the type 
of formulations found in mission statements of the EU Culture 
Programme, conceived of as a “serious social investment” and 
budgeted for to the tune of €400 million euro in 2007-2013. It 
lists as its objectives the “cross border mobility of cultural workers, 
the transnational circulation of artistic output and intercultural 
dialogue”, all of which will be furthered by three strands of activities, 
namely “cultural actions, European-level cultural bodies, and analysis 
and dissemination” (European Commission: Culture 2010). It is to 
the latter that I could attempt to make a contribution, not as a literary 
theorist, but as a South African writer who has heard successive 
authoritarian conservative and violently oppressive nationalist 
governments and their attendant culture police calling on artists to 
promote social cohesion in their work, a call which, in our context, 
amounts to simply an injunction to submit to dominant party 
ideology.
I also write as a student of J M Coetzee’s works that I take as 
examples of irreducible textuality or textualterity (Attridge 2004: 30), 
the production of which I consider to be the last honourable 
resort and only defence of progressive authors working in highly 
contested or agonistic conditions. Such conditions are known to 
intensify, locally and globally, when social and economic practices 
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and ideological orthodoxies of political status quos come under 
internal or external threat. At the risk of conflating widely divergent 
theoretical frameworks, I would like to demonstrate how one 
could, on the basis of a few filaments from the perspectives on art 
developed by Nancy, Barthes as well as Deleuze & Guattari, identify 
(an approach to) the kind of text that might refuse co-optation in an 
imagined hegemony fostered by city festivals in the context of the 
Culture Capital initiative of the EU Culture Programme. One could 
illustrate how a novel by Coetzee could be revived and ‘used’ as an 
oppositional intervention by analysing its outrageously subversive 
conceptual charge, its abject main character and its self-conscious 
deconstructivist anti-realist style. Obviously, the objection could 
be raised that such an approach would amount to simply another 
type of instrumentalisation. The difference would be that, instead of 
milking the text for the ‘messages’ that might fit a political agenda, 
the novel’s own undeniable and self-reflexively avowed strategies 
of unmaking, and ‘making strange’ would be aligned to support a 
counter-hegemonic agenda. Therefore, it would appear, to a greater or 
lesser extent, that the instrumentalisation of art is unavoidable; what 
matters is whose side one is on, the side of capitalist culture drives 
or the side of those striving to escape commodification by inventing 
new forms of collective and individual artistic autonomy. In the West, 
cultural production and artistic critique have long been smoothly 
absorbed in capitalist productivity and capitalist institutional self-
valorisation. Systemic protection and bolstering of capitalism has 
led to the neutralisation and recuperation of the critical power of art 
(Mouffe 2007). Strategic intensification of this kind of appropriation 
is likely if European owned big business stands to lose its competitive 
edge in the global economy and corporations have to fight every 
inch, and employ every method and every cultural asset towards 
strengthening their economic position.
1. Notes on culture and capitalism in a European 
context: commodity, identity, diplomacy
The ascension of the arts, initially via article 151 of the Maastricht 
Treaty and consequently in the agendas of the integrationist EU policy 
documents emanating from the Amsterdam, Lisbon and Europe 2020 
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strategies, must be attributed to the rhetorical ability of advocates 
of culture to successfully portray them as vital for the economic 
strengthening of the EU (Littoz-Monnet 2010). Culture (as industry) 
and the arts start to feature prominently only in the past decades as 
instruments towards the creation of Europe as a unitary economic 
market and as a globally competitive economic bloc (Culture Action 
Europe [s a]). The detractors to these general EU policy goals are widely 
registered as rising poverty, unemployment, and growing inequality 
(Farell [s a]). Add to this the potential of social conflict in culturally 
diverse urban populations, a disenfranchised nihilistically inclined 
youth and a general dissolution of traditional social forms and 
relationships in European society, and one can understand why artists 
and cultural workers could be called upon to invent for themselves an 
indispensable role as social regenerators and community adhesives.
It is, therefore, fairly obvious that the arts, sorely affected by 
austerity measures rising from the so-called European ‘debt crisis’, 
are likely to qualify for EU and national subsidies, via the support 
from, among others, the international corporations, if their official 
representatives could convincingly portray them as contributing to 
the promotion of peace, social cohesion and not only furthering the 
ideal of a European cosmopolitan civic identity, but also playing 
a role in national and international cultural diplomacy ventures. 
These and other cognate and related goals are clearly stated in the 
European Capitals of Culture initiative and one can well imagine 
how these goals can come to be reflected in funding formulas for 
commissioned artworks, music and dance performances, literature, 
academic contributions and prioritised cultural outreach programmes 
or transnational collaborations during culture festivals (European 
Commission: Culture 2012). The aims of the EU project for general 
European cohesion are also echoed in the national governments’ 
prioritising of national social cohesion programmes, as is the case in 
the Netherlands (Bureau Sociale Cohesie 2000).
When the intelligentsia also rationalise the (self-)instrument-
alisation of the arts towards government-recommended social goals, 
one would expect a flurry of protest from the art world in defence of 
music, painting, and literature as forms of autonomous experimental 
(self-)investigation and radical (self-)critique. Whereas the notion of 
avant-garde, from which this kind of reaction would have traditionally 
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been expected, has lost traction in today’s world, the presence of artistic 
“insurrectionaries”, willing to publicly question global capitalism, 
the order of the state and the ideology of neo-liberalist humanism, 
cannot be ignored (Mouffe 2007: 5).
If one could, therefore, imagine that it might be the popular 
mainstream arts that could help turn Europe from a post-democratic 
regime of bureaucrats towards a culture-branded transnational 
democracy re-invented in the federalist spirit, it can equally be 
imagined that it could be marginal activist-type artists and artistic 
collectives that would work to undermine the eventual essentialisms, 
complacencies, and ideological closures that could arise in such a 
federation. These agents could reveal the economic interests behind 
benign-sounding cultural initiatives; subvert the fictions of hegemonic 
politics, that is, ideas of origin, identity and presence, and question 
the concomitant mythical figures embodying the true and absolute 
subject of such a European arrangement.
Although explicit ‘totalitarian’ symbolical developments do 
admittedly seem, at present, quite remote in the struggle towards a 
unified Europe, the likelihood remains that extreme economic and 
political pressure experienced by large segments of the population 
might issue in rampant populism and exclusive ‘Europeanism’ 
and might propel raging narcissistic personalities into positions of 
‘leadership’. The current social investment in the arts and culture in 
Europe might be motivated, to a certain extent, by the desire of the 
European parliament to immunise the Union against these kinds of 
developments, signs of which are already borne out by right-wing 
movements and advocacy groups on the national level. The question 
remains: which images and figures, symbols and slogans might the 
Union, for its own part (and with the help of artists), want to employ 
towards achieving the opposite of ethnic-nationalist laager politics? 
Finally, and most importantly, in whose interest would this be if 
not in the interest of the big corporations, the investment banks 
and the financial markets who have recognised in art the ultimate 
commodity, the one that “sells all the rest”? (Holmes 2003).
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2. Towards an alternative normative horizon for 
the arts: Nancy, Barthes, Deleuze and Guattari
Having dipped into the slick self-assured official vocabularies in 
which culture policies are wrapped, one feels almost clownish when 
retaliating with buckshot from the discourses of the humanities. All 
the same, I would like to erect, as part of the normative horizon for 
the criticisms voiced in this article, Nancy’s notion of literariness (or 
art in general) which I shall cursorily gloss, in this instance, from a 
secondary source (Van Rooden 2007). Nancy’s rhetorical question 
can be formulated as follows: how can one in art and in community 
establish identity without invoking the danger of totalisation viz 
totalitarianism? Nancy’s alternative to this is well known: one can 
insist on openness through a post-romantic literature of fragments 
representing a radically fractal notion of community, a community 
that is always only a becoming and never a completed unitary 
work, an unmade community. It is the task of literature as event/
fragment to express not the foundations, but the groundlessness of 
human existence.
In this sense, art neither presents something, nor does it refer to the 
unpresentable; rather, it merely articulates the fact that presentation 
is happening in a certain mode. If, in the context of this desired 
fractality, one wants as an artist to reinvent the figure, it will neither 
be an absolute figure nor total figurelessness, but rather a becoming-
figure, or a process of figuration, the tracing of an always-moving 
figure that is neither a figure of myth nor a figure of phantasm, 
but a kairos that is always an event, an appearance of Being itself 
without ever presenting any singular finalised being. That something 
is figured, however, means that nothing is allowed to congeal in 
a hard and fast what-ness. The that-ness only appears as a style, a 
modality, so that what is presented is co-original with the way, the 
mode of presentation. Only the that-ness of an artwork embodies 
a style. Style is never a quality of a fixed figure with mythological 
content. Myth has no style. The that-ness of art could be understood 
as an ‘ontological literariness’ which would define artistic activity 
as a setting-in-motion-of-an-event-of-figuration, instead of seeking 
stasis either in a fixed figure or complete lack of figure. This would 
mean that the figuration of the figure is in itself no figure or form, 
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but a force of formation, an energy, a violence or an intensity; it is 
the Other of form; it is that which always interrupts and destabilises 
form. The ontological figuration posited by Nancy is not an activity 
whereby something is produced, but the singular continuous creative 
act of producing, itself. The world itself, the community itself is, 
in this sense, an infinite singular mode of appearing, is itself an 
ontological figuration of Being instead of a completed work. Being is 
a continuous exposure to the opening of the world, and can as such 
only be articulated in literature which is its co-continuous inscription. 
Being, in this sense, is itself a kind of “literature”; it hovers between 
the formless state of merely appearing and its fixation in a figure (Van 
Rooden 2007: 77).
The question is whether under the conditions of (self-)
instrumentalisation of the arts at the behest of a grand European 
political project, this fixed ‘figure’, that Nancy rejects, risks being 
inscribed in literary works. Would the degree to which they bear 
inscription of the proper ‘figures’ qualify literary works when 
cultural organisers make selections for prescribed or discussed works? 
Would inscription of explicit ‘figures’ ultimately qualify works for 
inclusion in, for instance, a ‘cosmopolitan’ literary canon as part of 
an obligatory curriculum for all foreigners seeking citizenship and 
further afield for all nationals, and even ultimately for all European 
citizens? Could it be foreseen that one day a common European canon 
could be propagated through the social media? In the light of the 
decline of multicultural policies and the rise of more or less coercive 
integrationist policies (Kymlicka 2012: 18), these questions might not 
even seem far-fetched. A revival of a very old legacy at the basis of 
European cultural history might be at stake. In this context, Sloterdijk 
argues that literature as a means towards “taming the beast” and 
rescuing people from barbarism, knitting them together as members 
of an elite club of literates who hear the same messages and revere the 
same canons, has been one of the mainstays of humanist civilisation 
since Graeco-Roman times and has informed the Enlightenment’s 
revival of the classics and, beyond that, has also provided a measure of 
the cultural cement of bourgeois nation states of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. But, how must one understand a possible renewed 
interest in literature in what, according to Sloterdijk (1999), must be 
understood as post-literary, post-epistolatory and post-humanistic 
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times where the co-existence of people has been founded on new bases 
and where societies can achieve their political and cultural cohesion 
only marginally through literary, epistolatory and humanistic media?
To sharpen the polemics of this argument, one could, therefore, 
finally ask: would an imagined European city literary festival, benignly 
aimed at the cultivation of peace in diversity and mutual respect 
and dialogue across cultures, social cohesion, and the promotion 
of cosmopolitan feelings, readily select for reprinting and public 
discussion a book such as Life and times of Michael K? Would a writer 
like J M Coetzee be deemed naturally suitable for interviews and 
panels in cultural programmes promulgating the notion of the social 
responsibility of the artist? Would his novels, taken as ‘letters to 
friends’ even be recognised for the ‘serious play’ that they offer in a 
world where everything but ‘ontological literariness’ is in demand?
The organisers of Culture Capital festivities would more likely 
prefer sophisticated readerly (lisible) texts, offering pleasure and 
enjoyment of a fixed and pleasant identity – for example, the ‘figure’ 
of a ‘tolerant’ and ‘art-loving’ European cosmopolite. It could be 
imagined that the organisers might want to avoid difficult, even 
repellent, so-called writerly (scriptable) texts that, through their 
contagious self-consciousness, would subvert ‘metropolitan’ 
subjectivity; fracture the structures of signification through which 
the reader identifies him-/herself as such; explode literary codes, and 
instigate an unhinging form of bliss. Briefly, cultural programme 
makers might want to prevent civic mindedness from being usurped 
by jouissance in Barthes’s sense of the word (Barthes 1973: 36).
In the analysis of Coetzee’s text, I will attempt to indicate how a 
fusion of Barthes’s idea of the writerly text with Nancy’s idea of the 
text as an event of figuration might provide a starting point for an 
oppositional artistic practice of reading and writing. It is indeed a text 
which, through its meta-fictional and self-deconstructing strategies, 
coincides with nothing but its style, that is, with its way of presenting 
its own that-ness. It is essential that, in this instance, one could include 
in its singular stylistics its manner of performing critical concepts by 
means of freshly imagined sensations. With concepts engendered in 
this way, the author does not finalise the figure, but permanently places 
it in abeyance/becoming as an ever-germinating form of subjectivity. 
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The sensual jouissance proposed by Barthes could, therefore, gain an 
added dimension of conceptual critique of the subject. The bliss 
of reading might illuminate the set ‘figures’, myths, opinions and 
identifications onto which the reader’s self-understanding might be 
locked. Conceptually perverse, queer or critical jouissance is what I 
would like to suggest, therefore, as a further strengthening of the 
counter-hegemonic notion of literature that I am proposing in this 
instance. To flesh this out, I would utilise a third cognate dimension, 
namely that of the Deleuzo-Guattarian theory of creativity – I would 
like to show how one could read the conceptual figure of Michael K 
as a critique of neo-liberal notions of the individual and the capitalist 
state without reducing the text to allegory.
Would the ways in which a book such as Life and times of Michael 
K could possibly make a contribution to social cohesion necessarily 
fit in with the Utrecht Principles? (Vrede van Utrecht 2013: 2012). 
Would it be too far-fetched to imagine that intensive reading of 
Michael K in Utrecht could link people in an intimate process of 
experiencing the ravishment effected by excellent writing, and that 
they might prefer this communal experience to the mass enjoyment of 
cultural variety spectacles? Although case studies of the effect of art in 
designated communities are notoriously difficult to set up and would 
seem to contribute little of lasting value, one should not write off 
these possibilities (Belfiore 2002). A Barthesian jouissance provoked by 
‘ontological literariness’ might reinforce the readership’s experience 
of the openness of ever-nascent community. The critical (conceptual) 
dimension of this kind of communal jouissance would be informed, 
not by commercial cosmopolitan propaganda, but by style in the 
modality of violent and intense energy that Nancy associates with 
fractal literary figuration. The momentary intimate communal aspect 
of reading-for-bliss could instil the anticipation of an open community, 
the community of permanent becoming that Nancy denotes as the 
fractal form of communal cohesion. In these terms, the creative as well 
as the receptive moments of literary figuration would celebrate the 
groundlessness of existence, revoking both the affirmative pleasures 
offered by the texts and the presence of identity. “Enter the Orphic 
Anarchists of the Peace of Utrecht celebrations!” one might want to 
exclaim. They might want to dance with the Yes Men on the stage of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Mouffe 2007). The outcome 
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of such a reading experience might indeed issue in radical critique of 
consumerism, of the modern capitalist state’s ideological and coercive 
apparatuses for surveillance and control, of the manipulative means 
with which it secures the economy in the interest of so-called ‘free 
trade’, of its shrewdly moralistic-sounding ideas of thrift, industry, 
and austerity, of its norm of the ambition-driven self-preening 
individual – not to mention its attempts at domesticating the non-
European foreigner into the aureole of liberal humanism and human 
rights, while simultaneously raising its thresholds against displaced 
borderless sub-citizens, refugees, sans papiers and migrant workers 
from the global South.
It is certainly not outlandish to imagine that organisers of festive 
city events and policy developers for the funding of socially responsible 
literature might want to give a wide berth to literary material of a 
certain ‘wild’ cut, while promoting safer kinds of work. What would 
that mean for literature, for the arts and for society in the long run? As 
much as literature could be the opium of people swept up in a trance 
of nationalism, or a smooth mirror for European self-admiration 
and self-promotion, as much I still rather romantically believe that 
it is the place where the cry of the haunted soul in the desert can 
be heard, the soul who, astride on the back of a tiger, will proclaim 
the abyss underneath, and will point out that the knowledge, values 
and routines of our everyday life constitute nothing but ashes, a 
columbarium of dead concepts (Nietzsche 1922: 77-82).
One has to thoroughly peruse the documents of the European 
Culture Programme for a trace of acknowledgement of vulnerability as 
a value of artistic form/style, or as a founding idea of an oppositional 
artistic ethics. Is it because, in directing itself at an erudite, highly 
educated populace, this idea is absolutely taken for granted, or is it 
because, in the enthusiasm of a total cultural offensive, it has been 
totally forgotten? Lucebert, one of the great Dutch poets, reminded 
us that “alles van waarde is weerloos”.1 The point is that it is the 
vulnerability of the form and style of self-questioning that is of 
importance in works of art, even and especially in the clamour of self-
assured and benign statements from artists expressing social concern 
with the wretched of the earth. The challenge is how to secure this 
1 Translation: everything of value is vulnerable.
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value against appropriation, branding and commodification, and 
how to make the social concern appear different from a Benetton 
advertisement.
3. Language, ideology, class and the notion of the 
socially responsible artist
In order to put into relief the type of oppositional ‘literary’ values I 
draw from the work of Nancy and Barthes, I would like to quote from 
the mission statement of the Social Responsibility Series organised by 
the Centre of the Humanities in Utrecht. The following could serve as 
an example of how the instrumentalisation of the arts and the social 
responsibility of the artist are currently co-constructed:
Artists hold a social power in today’s represented and mediated 
world. Whether in film, music or literature, the artists’ chosen 
form of expression has the ability to reach a broad audience, 
whilst communicating their social and political concerns. How do 
they assume responsibility as an artist, and in which way do they 
express their political and social concern for current issues such 
as precarious living, poverty and environmental change, war and 
suffering? (Universiteit Utrecht, Centre for the Humanities 2012)
Whereas one cannot question the benevolent and progressive 
sentiment behind such a formulation, one is equally alerted to a certain 
lack of nuance, a lack that might simply be attributed to the rhetorical 
nature of a public announcement. However, is it not precisely in 
such innocent announcements that assumptions are hidden and 
meaning is ideologically mobilised? The statement strangely fails to 
differentiate between the controlled functional language in which 
artists clothe their consciously held opinions and the open and risky 
procedures whereby they render their materials expressive to a degree 
far exceeding their intentions. Secondly, it does not make explicit the 
productive and performative relation of all art to ideology (that is, 
ideology in a critical sense) (Eagleton 1976, Thompson 1984). Thirdly 
and most importantly, it does not reflect the fact that class position 
and privilege might blind urban artists to the questionable act of 
blithely assuming authority when speaking for, or about the suffering 
masses of the world.
To say, for instance, as in the statement quoted above, that the 
responsible artists would “communicate” their political and social 
Acta Academica 2013: 45(4)
12
concerns via their “chosen form of expression” reveals the conflation 
of two very distinct forms of discursivity. Failure to distinguish 
between the indirect imaginative appeal of an author’s novels and 
his/her declared political opinions is usually grounded in, first, an 
under-estimation of the implications of the metaphoric nature of 
language and its precipitation in the language of fiction; secondly, 
in a misunderstanding of the status of reference in works of fiction; 
thirdly, in the disregard of the explorative, associative nature of much 
of the writerly process and, fourthly, in a disavowal of the non-identical 
or multiple nature of the subject which is often radically exploited 
during the artistic process. In my opinion, one has to disconnect the 
artistic project from other more direct forms of communication – 
the artist who refuses to instrumentalise his/her work in the service 
of a recommended social concern might, in his/her capacity as 
public intellectual, hold recognisably progressive opinions. Indeed, 
s/he would be able to “communicate” these opinions clearly and 
unambiguously in essays, reviews, public interviews and other forms 
of functional rhetoric which are subject to specific standards of 
disambiguation, clarity, transparency and coherence.
As to the matter of ideology, one needs to first make the superfluous 
observation that writers through the ages have spontaneously and of 
necessity responded to their environment and used as materials for 
their art the facts and incidents of life as they knew it. If not simply 
part of a bio-psycho-social-information feedback loop of human 
existence itself, is fiction writing as a symbolical form not a way of 
‘answering’ to, or ‘performing’ the most pressing ideas, sensibilities, 
fears and desires of one’s times? If it were not so, it would have been 
impossible for analyses from a wide range of ideological critical literary 
theoretical orientations to have been let loose on novels and poems. 
These (neo-Marxist, feminist, postcolonial) critiques invariably - and 
often at the price of reduction of the literariness of works of fiction - 
demonstrate how, for instance, novels can never escape staging more 
or less consciously, more or less critically, performances/renditions/
executions of the ruling ideologies of their time about, say, matters of 
race, class and gender.
If this perspective is not somehow included in mission briefs such 
as the one quoted earlier, one might be led to believe that the call for 
literature’s contribution to social cohesion and the need for artists to 
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be socially responsible are motivated by a desire (unconscious?) for a 
literature that, because of its authors’ irreproachable social concerns, 
would somehow escape the imbrications of ideology. Surely, one 
would not want to promote a fully transparent literature, a literature 
that, for instance, allegorises without residue the concepts of a 
liberalist free-market philosophy, or a literature propagating utopian 
humanistic fantasies of global peace and harmony, or a literature that 
domesticates the other as potentially the same?
It must be noted, lastly, that the statement quoted earlier makes 
no reference whatsoever to the privileged class position encasing 
the majority of metropolitan artists. It offers no critique of the 
subsidising of the media through which ‘responsible’ art would 
be funded and broadcast; it does not acknowledge the contexts of 
a-symmetrical power enabling metropolitan artists to ply, export and 
sell their trade. Is one supposed to accept that artists are cloaked in 
a natural and universally acknowledged superiority of insight and 
an authority that begs no explanation? If, on the other hand, the 
privileged authority of the type of artist that is universalised in the 
statement quoted earlier is indeed tacitly acknowledged, a further 
question would be how artists themselves attempt to include, self-
reflectively, this authority in the form of their work? What form of 
story could one, if one is a metropolitan writer with access to all the 
media, in the first place authorise oneself to write ‘about’ the abjectly 
poor, the socially excluded, the displaced, the victims of war and 
environmental change?
It is the specifically fraught South African political situation 
that forced a writer such as J M Coetzee to radically problematise, 
throughout his oeuvre, this matter of the privileged writer’s agency and 
authority to deal with historical inequality and injustice. In his case, 
part of the (ab-)‘solution’ would consist of the ethically self-conscious 
writerly procedure called ‘prose that thinks’, as opposed to prose that 
illustrates preconceived opinions, and even more exacting, it would 
consist of (creating the effect of) relinquishing the author’s power 
over his/her characters. These types of solutions point to a kind of 
discursive writerly process, that, as I will attempt to show, stand greatly 
removed from any role of ‘social responsibility’ assumed as a matter of 
course. They entail a critique of the right, often appropriated without 
a second thought by artists, to name, to state, to judge, to speak for, 
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to advocate in the arena of racial and class oppression, exclusion and 
exploitation. It is this prior move, before blithely donning the cloak 
of ‘responsibility’, this gesture of naked self-authorisation and its 
immediate ethical implications for the way of writing, that seems to 
be fully eclipsed by the formulation of the statement quoted earlier.
A critique of the so-called social responsibility of the artist 
strengthens the argument for critical jouissance as a writerly practice. I 
imagine that Nancy’s type of artist would resist, for one, the adoption 
of a socially responsible ‘role’. S/he would suspect that even his/
her most sincere agreement with lofty popular ideals would entail 
buying into myths, opinions and exemplary ‘figures’. His/her greatest 
responsibility would be to hone the techniques, enabling him/her 
to write fiction that is sufficiently complex and hermetic to resist 
reduction and totalisation, even if s/he him-/herself attempted it. 
His/her interest in writerly integrity always comes with its own 
vocational ethical concerns that, I believe, should take preference 
above the sanctioned dictates of public art policies.
That said, one must acknowledge that everything in material and 
symbolical culture will be and always has been instrumentalised for 
the purpose of enhancing power in the field of social force. The 
majority of authors will know that conceiving of, and writing a novel 
is a process of distributing their personhood and of investing their 
work with social agency and symbolical efficacy (Gell 1998). In a 
sense, novelists operate no differently from butterflies when engaged 
in the displays of delightful and intimidating ‘hill topping’ during 
mating contests. Proceeding to publish a work is a forceful political 
act in an already contested field, and one knows that once out there, 
the work will be sucked up and knocked about in the vortex of any 
and all ideological and/or lucrative uses that can be made of it by 
parties who dispute each other’s dominance in agonistic public 
spaces. There is no writing that can truly be called un- or a-political 
and there is no other writer in South-Africa who has come to terms 
with this fact, interrogating the question of representativeness, the 
limits of authority, the legitimacy of agency, in such a writerly way as 
J M Coetzee (Atwell 1993: 3).
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4. The hero, the victim or the other: a novel of 
alterity against a need for the spectacular
Coetzee’s fourth novel was written a decade prior to the regime change 
of 1994, the change that heralded a transition which is still, with 
every indication to the contrary, propagated locally as one towards 
a constitutional democracy. Did Coetzee, in this fictive persona, 
anticipate the continued abjection of the earth grubbers under the 
reign of a neo-colonial nationalist élite?
The story, briefly, is about the desperate peregrinations of a 
hare-lipped, mentally challenged man with the Kafka-esque name 
of Michael K who, fired from his job as a Cape Town city parks 
gardener during a social uprising against the oppressive government, 
builds a wheelbarrow and sets out on foot along the highway with 
his sick mother to her vaguely remembered place of birth in the 
country where she intends to come to her end. His mother sadly dies 
en route and thus begins her son’s search for a place of refuge which 
he can call home. Michael K ends up barely living in a burrow on an 
abandoned farm surviving on almost nothing except his own slow 
thoughts, while tenderly watering his pumpkin plants by night. When 
a troupe of revolutionary guerrillas arrive on the farm, he hides from 
them, deciding that, in times of war, somebody must stay behind to 
tend to the garden. From there on it is a saga of getting arrested by 
soldiers and repeatedly interred under martial law in a concentration 
camp and a military hospital, where officials, baffled and outraged 
by the elusive, nonresponsive resistance that he offers, subject him 
to relentless efforts of categorisation and identification. Michael K 
succeeds time and again in escaping from these coercive institutions, 
all the while getting thinner and more detached until finally he ends 
up back in Cape Town, where, surrendering to depletion, he goes to 
die in his mother’s former hovel, an unused service chamber meant 
to house an electric generator underneath a staircase in a block of 
seafront flats.
From this short summary alone, that reflects nothing as yet of the 
visceral impact, the conceptual acuity, let alone of the deconstructive 
ruses and meta-fictional set-up of the novel, it is eminently clear that 
Coetzee is playing an entirely singular game with notions of ‘victim’ 
and ‘resistance’. He scandalously proposes a wholly independent and 
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‘poetically’ subversive victim, whose resistance consists of avoidant 
yielding and silent withdrawal. He also equips his character with slowly 
forming counter-hegemonic musings on charity, caring, sharing, real 
needs, work, time, the state, the need for borders, for property, our 
relationship with plants and animals, and the subjectivity necessary 
for the reproduction of society under the law. Taken together, these 
musings amount to a philosophy of suspicion regarding common 
sense judgements of ‘the other’, everyday opinions about justice, 
clichés of liberal humanism and, in the South African context, it 
debunks the self-glorifying habits of ‘spectacular’ struggle literature, 
insisting instead on the facticity of abject suffering.
Coetzee’s text would, therefore, frustrate interpretations made 
by socially concerned critics, be they of the victim-loving or the 
hagiographic kind. The text thwarts our naive and sentimental 
compassion for ‘poor outcasts’ and our equally naive fantasies of the 
future as a consensus of the victorious. This is exactly the reason why 
the work was rejected by ‘organic’ intellectuals during the concluding 
phases of real historical political struggle. In hindsight, it is a 
compliment for Coetzee’s novel that, apart from all the predictably 
disgruntled parties (Atwell 1993: 92), none other than his future fellow 
Nobel laureate, Nadine Gordimer, took the bait. Her criticism arises 
from an ideological aesthetic position that cannot tolerate unsettling 
and unresolved imaginative explorations of South Africans’ anxieties 
without at least a clear moral judgement, or political self-positioning 
unambiguously inscribed in the work itself and emanating from the 
implicit author (Gordimer 1984). She seems to suggest that the worth 
of literature does not reside in the ruthless fictional imagining of the 
South African ‘wound’, but in the idealistic stitching that would close 
the gash and in the balm that would prove to soothe it (Donadio 2007).
If European literature-for-peace enthusiasts would wonder what 
kind of literary writing about less grievable lives (Butler 2009: 38) 
would produce “concerned” citizens, they could, therefore, consider 
reading ‘obscure’ literary forays into civilisation’s ‘wound’. One 
could advise that, by including ‘sombre (or in the Kantian sense, 
‘sublime’) stories in the literary activities planned for 2013, a literary 
‘twin’ would be provided for investigations of the ‘dark’, colonial 
and commercial rearrangements accompanying the conclusion of the 
1713 Utrecht Peace Treaty. Instead of domesticating precarious lives 
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for cosmopolitan literary consumption, ‘responsible’ artists taking 
part in these festivities might be encouraged to catapult, like Coetzee, 
the idea of the human far beyond the frontiers of comfortable 
identification with the other and force the reader to embrace the 
most abject vulnerability and suffering within him-/herself. By 
critically interrogating artworks that explicitly assume and advertise 
social responsibility, counter-hegemonic cultural activists could stage 
the need to keep the notion of the human itself mysteriously and 
subversively alive so as to undermine cosy notions of who and what 
we are, or think we are, as rulers and as subjects, as rejects and as abjects 
of each other. What remains to be clarified, in some detail, are the 
exemplary strategies whereby a South African novel from the 1980s 
realises this alterity to such an extent that it currently still provokes 
one to hold its weird mirror to one’s face, as a shield against the 
deafening discourses of sameness.
5. The conceptual persona: prose that thinks versus 
prose that opines
If the point of my argument is to highlight the special resistance 
of self-conscious fiction to ruling orthodoxies or to theoretical 
reduction, Coetzee’s work presents one with singular challenges, 
because of its insistence on ideas. Since his first Booker Prize for 
Life and times of Michael K, Coetzee has generated a stupendous 
amount of critical work, mostly because of the extremely fertile 
dovetailing of the formal and thematic concerns staged in them and 
the frameworks of enquiry dominating the study of literature over 
the past decades: issues about colonial and postcolonial identity, the 
construction of subjectivity, and the historical determinations of 
human social organisation. As such, it has offered a rich catch for 
academics attempting to fish out from the texts the elements and 
problems articulated in these disciplines. Time and again it is proven 
that Coetzee has pre-empted the critics in staging the historical and 
symbolical conditions for the production of his texts (Vermeulen 
2010: 269). Globally, intellectuals agree that his novels display not 
only an intellect of extreme prowess fully in command of all the 
contemporary theoretical fields, but also a literary phenomenon of 
specific originality. One could say that Coetzee’s novels are original, 
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because they are deliberately ‘philosophical’ without in the least being 
abstract. They deeply engage philosophical ideas of domination and 
subjection, the power and authority of fiction, language and truth, 
of violence and suffering, of master and slave, without producing 
reading obstacles for the non-expert reader. It is, in fact, the very shape 
of these ideas that intensify the unsettling effect of the work. The ideas 
can only have this effect by being conceived, mobilised and vitalised 
in a non-instrumental writing process, that is, a process in which the 
materiality of language and the deferral of meaning are fully indulged. 
Although conceptualised to the hilt, the figure of Michael is no mere 
coat for prior authorial opinions. The character is fully developed in 
experiential terms and grounded in compelling turns of the narrative 
that unfolds in naturalistically portrayed space and time. Coetzee 
himself is clear about this when he states that:
it is naïve to think that writing is a two stage process: first you decide 
what you want to say, then you say it. One writes, he says, because 
one does not know what one wants to say, writing reveals to one 
what one wanted to say in the first place […] Truth is something that 
comes in the process of writing, or comes from the process of writing 
(Atwell 1992: 18).
He insists that these truths are not the truths of history, and that the 
author allows the novel “to work out its own truths outside the terms 
of class conflict, gender conflict or any of the other oppositions out 
of which historic disciplines erect themselves”. Protesting against the 
“colonization of the novel by the discourses of history”, he states 
that “storytelling is not a way of making messages more, as they 
say, ‘effective’. Storytelling is another mode of thinking” (Coetzee 
1988a: 4).
I take the author’s insistence on “thinking” and “truth”, terms 
clearly denoting the realm of philosophy, as license to introduce, at this 
point, Deleuze & Guattari’s (1991) theory of creativity. It is especially 
the notion of the conceptual persona that proves to be heuristically 
fruitful (Deleuze & Guattari 1991: 61-83). In distinguishing the ways in 
which creativity functions in the fields of art, philosophy and science, 
they claim the notion of the conceptual persona exclusively for the 
domain of philosophy. As examples, they cite Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 
Plato’s Socrates and Nicholas of Cusa’s Idiot (Deleuze & Guattari 
1991: 64), personae utilised to dramatise and narrativise concepts. 
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They argue, on the other hand, that novelists work with aesthetic 
figures, like captain Ahab in Melville’s Moby Dick. These figures are, 
according to them, exclusively portrayed as stylised, heightened, new-
fangled ‘blocs of sensations’, worked up through the artists’ craft from 
material that is rendered fully expressive. To distinguish them from 
everyday perceptions and affections, Deleuze & Guattari (1991: 65) 
name these artistically modelled original sensations “percepts” and 
“affects”. The occasional merging of the fields of philosophy and art, 
they hold, could be illustrated by, for instance, the hybrid work Igitur 
by Mallarmé (Deleuze & Guattari 1991: 67). Any reader, however, 
who would compare the language used in Igitur by Mallarmé to that 
wielded by Coetzee, would immediately recognise the difference. Igitur 
exhibits abstraction, obscurity, wordiness, a less than fully imagined 
literal situation and a free-floating voice that never solidifies into 
character-effect. The reading instruction Mallarmé gives at the outset 
declares this as “intended”: “This Story is addressed to the Intelligence 
of the reader which stages things itself” (Mallarmé 1982: 91).
In Coetzee’s novel, however, the conceptual persona is fully staged 
in naturalistic terms, although he is portrayed in an anti-realistic 
distancing voice that prevents the reader from appropriating 
his emotions (Attridge 2004: 50-1). Coetzee’s fiction differs from 
philosophical or abstract allegory in that it is, in most instances, 
sumptuously dotted with detail. Although in the case of Life and 
times of Michael K the naturalistic city-scape is ‘futurised’ in a violent 
suppression of social unrest, the writing does not succumb to historic 
allegory. Michael K exemplifies the life of one individual fugitive 
among convoys of refugees leaving the city, while a local reader would 
also see in him the outline of a permanent South African psychosocial 
type, the homeless vagrant.
One could suggest that Coetzee, while avoiding the trap of 
a Mallarméan mode of abstract writing, succeeds in combining 
elements of a conceptual persona and a literary figure in the design 
of the character of Michael K. As a hybrid conceptual/sensate figure, 
Michael K therefore opens up an additional combinational option 
for the analytical instrumentarium employed by Deleuze & Guattari: he 
is a conceptual figure sporting certain features that enable his author 
to create a new experiential region, the region of human life at the 
outer edges of physical and cognitive coherence.
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This region, however, is constituted in a writerly compound of 
multiple levels, so that the figure of Michael K remains radically open, a 
figuring rather than a figure, a kairos rather than a ‘truthful’, mythical 
identity. This radical openness distinguishes Coetzee’s character from 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra who could, because of his abstract allegorical 
traits, be appropriated by German national-socialist thinking in a 
time of economical and identity crisis (Van Rooden 2007: 82). Coetzee 
avoids the possibility of this kind of ideological appropriation by 
a threefold articulation of this new experiential region, a literary 
articulation that prevents a final interpretation of exactly what it 
is that Michael K is experiencing and by extension what Michael K 
stands for. His sensations can always simultaneously be related, first, 
to real-life morbid symptoms; secondly, to a pre-reflective form of 
‘Being-unto-death’ and, thirdly, to a becoming-other that reaches into 
the sphere of the non-human.
On the first level, the instances of Michael K’s bodily self-
awareness can be read as the typical symptoms of starvation, trauma, 
exposure and shock in homeless or displaced people: a slow, tentative 
drifting mental grasp of things, wavering decision-making, vacant 
attentiveness without desire or aversion to people and surroundings, 
diminished appetite and interest, minimal interference in, or exchange 
with the material world, a hypersensitivity to sound and movement, 
interspersed with dizzy spells, a primal mute resistance to being 
captured and restrained in the private moments of dying, a distant 
mode of caring for, and nurturing of the self. As often in Coetzee, the 
naturalist level of the narrative is strictly upheld to the very last closing 
moments of the book when Michael’s final withdrawal coincides with 
the terminal burrowing or hide-and-die behaviour of certain animals.
At the same time, though, and often in the same sentence or 
phrase, these ‘symptoms’ are written as though they arise from an 
independent force of self-negation in a victim who subverts his 
vulnerability through radicalising and poeticising, by his own hand, 
in his own person, through his own understanding, imagination and 
effort, the very intentions of his torturers: to denude, to rename, 
to correct, to isolate, to silence, to classify, to ration, to humiliate 
and finally to ‘dissolve’ his outsider existence. Out-outsidering his 
outsider-ers by wilfully wilting into non-existence, by choosing death 
and shrinking into nothingness is the way in which Coetzee, through 
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his character, flushes his readers from standard notions, not only of 
victimhood, but also of heroic revolt against oppression.
It does not end here, however, for this death-seeking behaviour in the 
main character seems only a threshold to a still further metamorphosis, 
a euphoric aliveness to negation as a condition of fastening onto a 
beyond, while not moving, not eating, sleeping, leaking into a zone 
of indiscernible non-human becoming. The writing accelerates and 
intensifies in these moments where bliss envelops the main character; 
the reader is enraptured by the stature of a “giant” or “monument” 
of sensations, rising paradoxically from the wrecked body of a feral 
human prey (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 167-78).
The point is that none of the three levels are ever allowed to 
dominate at the exclusion of any of the others, so that the reader 
is suspended in an unresolved amalgam of emotions: common 
sympathy with a homeless person, revulsion at a self-abasing will to 
death, and wonderment at the cosmic, almost numinous, reaches of 
an unheard-of becoming. The artifice of Coetzee’s language draws 
the reader into this indeterminate region of experience, and makes 
him/her complicit in unfamiliar feelings, perceptions and cognitions 
(Attridge 1994). In Deleuzian terms, the reader is made party to a 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of concepts of suffering 
and precarious living, an unmaking of opinion and received messages, 
including taboos of South African political orthodoxy and Christian-
humanistic platitudes.
It is hoped that I have made clear that it is only at the risk of 
radically reducing the carefully conditioned openness of the text 
that Life and times of Michael K could be read as an ethical-existential 
encyclopaedia of precarious living. In such a ‘socially concerned’ 
reading, one would gratefully find everything covered, from derelict 
improvised shelters, to perilously caught and scavenged food, to 
symptoms of displacement, hunger and physical exposure. Equally 
insufficient would be a philosophical reading in which one could 
console oneself by finding that Michael K embodies a “principle of 
Being, a state of existence prior to knowledge, rooted in a minimalist 
principle of survival” (Head 2009: 31).What is revealed is not a 
principle of survival, but a perverted version of the existentialist 
notion of ‘Being-unto-death’. This is not to be understood in the 
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Heideggerian sense as a state of enlightened urgency, but as a state of 
dumb animal suffering of the inevitable, a being suffering-towards-
death (Vermeulen 2010: 270). Whether this ontology of suffering 
could be considered a “deconstruction of the deconstructionist 
elusiveness” of the main character is a matter of debate (Head 2009: 
31). Interpretation of what Michael K stands for remains inconclusive, 
because of the indomitable energy of fabulation, of creating the 
other as an event, a happening, as has been convincingly argued by 
Attridge (1994). It is in this quality that resides the novel’s difference, 
its literariness, its excellence, a quality that is very badly tolerated or 
appreciated by instrumentalists of every hue. In this novel, and this 
is the point, one could suggest that the text maintains its literariness, 
its difference, without relinquishing its conceptual critique; it is a 
textual happening of idea-saturation in the sockets of the visceral, a 
becoming-incarnate of ideas in compounds of sensation, releasing a 
figure of literature that is “too alive to be liveable or lived” (Deleuze 
& Guattari 1994: 171). This will be the closest I can get to answering 
the question as to what kind of conceptual art a naturalistic literary 
novel can be without descending into allegory. It is finally the very 
openness of the text as a sensate conceptuary that involves the reader 
in the recognition of a new possibility of being, that of a contrarious, 
partly euphoric, counter-victim existing at degree zero – a moment of 
insight into suffering that could be profoundly liberating and even 
life changing. Anonymity, silence, exile, and cunning might be the 
only forms of resistance that artists themselves can consider in these 
times; emulating Michael K would entail being an escape artist, a 
hunger artist resisting consumerism.
Coetzee becomes a writer of ‘classic’ or ‘resistant’ novels by 
insisting, first, on his situatedness, engaging the specific questions of 
his time and place, and then exploiting them counter-hegemonically, 
with no other view than to create preposterous literary effects and 
to displace moralistic rhetoric and theoretical discourse alike in the 
course of pursuing his writerly ‘truths’. This autonomy, the fact that 
the text, in content and in form, gives itself its own nomos or law, 
explains why, four decades after its first publication, a never-ending 
stream of commentaries still, and in vain, attempt to stitch up Michael 
K into the latest nomenclatures of ‘bare life’ and ‘homo sacer’.
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6. A note on text analysis
The perennial problem of literary criticism, to make explicit in 
functional language how the novel creates its effects, is exacerbated 
in all of Coetzee’s superbly opaque novels. One could, of course, 
attempt to unravel one by one the delicate semantic and syntactical 
niceties of the text, or to list and describe all the traps and sluices of 
image and mood that compel us to carry on reading word by word, 
sentence by sentence, page after page in a state of uncomfortable 
arousal. Needless to say that such an undertaking would not only want 
to tell “the truth of literature that literature itself cannot tell” (Attridge 
2004: 64), but also dampen, through its longwinded translation into 
functional language, the fleeting tremors that, ahead of conceptual 
comprehension, grip the body of the reader. What remains, after this 
task has been passed up as too difficult, is to excavate the realm of 
the concepts. At the risk, therefore, of stuffing the main character 
back into the camps that he spent his life avoiding and of fastening 
onto his author an explicitness that he has expertly sabotaged, one 
could attempt a mapping of Michael K’s ‘features’ by applying the 
operational categories identified by Deleuze & Guattari for the 
philosophical persona to the conceptual figure. This might enable 
an articulation of Michael K’s oppositional creatureliness into a 
conceptual syntax within which to further elaborate the three levels 
of sensations set out earlier.
7. Michael K as ‘slow man’: handicap as ‘potency’
Among the features of the conceptual persona, as distinguished by 
Deleuze & Guattari – pathic, existential, juridical, relational and 
dynamic – pathic features seem to be of primary importance in the 
characterisation of Michael K; his pathology is a device for harvesting 
surprising literalisations and ambiguities: handicap as empowerment, 
disfigurement as blazon, vulnerability as autonomy, and all the moves 
of connecting nothingness and suffering itself to potency. This 
ambiguity, it must be stressed, remains mobilised throughout the 
text and is never allowed resolution. This will be taken as understood, 
even if the following reading tends towards allegorical clarification of 
the notion of ‘Being-towards-death’, and its sequel of becoming-other. 
A clear and explicit allegory of ‘idiocy’ is not what keeps us alive to 
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the obscure fate of Michael K; rather, it is the risky suggestion that 
affliction and suffering make him abnormally honest, perceptive, 
thoughtful, ecstatic and prophetic.
The disfigurement of his hare-lip compromises suckling, together 
with his hampered speech and slow mind, make him a candidate for 
institutionalisation; it determines his inability to form relationships 
with people, but creates space for a consoling relationship with plants 
and with himself as gardener. His dynamic features, the shy, avoidant 
behaviour and his shunning and hiding movements arise from these 
same defects. In the same instance that his handicap marks him as 
a ‘special case’ for discipline and punishment, it enables his escape. 
So silent and so shadowlike is he, so anonymous and negligible, that 
his absence, in body or in spirit, is only noticed long after he has 
departed. From his simple-mindedness follow, similarly, the features 
of his innocence and his vulnerability to unjust treatment, qualities 
whereby he is slyly promoted by the author to the position of judge 
and conscientious of the very law that seeks to subject him.
Michael K truly is Coetzee’s first ‘slow man’, a figure of physical 
and mental suffering, repeatedly encountered in several guises 
in Coetzee’s work, what Polet (1993: 89-97) would call the basic 
Döppelganger or personal myth structuring his work.
7.1 Pathic features: pathology as access to the 
post-human
As an effect of his idiot concreteness, Michael K is portrayed as 
intensely aware of his physical being. He easily abandons himself 
to eating, staring and dozing. Swamped by ‘animal’ aspects of his 
being, he comfortably drifts into indeterminate, non-distinct, passive, 
fleeting or opaque states. Often Michael K, through his susceptible 
naive imagination, experiences something Deleuze & Guattari 
would describe as becoming animal, and by extension, becoming 
plant, becoming stone, but this always in the tenor of depletion and 
deprivation. The idiot is decked out with heightened animal senses 
(Coetzee 1983: 140), with plant-like reactions to water and sun (Coetzee 
1983: 136), with earth-like experiences of passivity (Coetzee 1983: 137), 
with awareness of the fibrous connective qualities of his own flesh 
(Coetzee 1983: 242), and finally with the sensation of dissolving into 
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the transparent fleetness of water, air, light and shadow (Coetzee 
1983: 245).
In this way, the backward Michael K is raised to the height of a 
prodigy of the senses – his slowness and disfigurement are transformed 
into impersonal powers of material long-suffering-ness and uncanny 
clairvoyance. Throughout the novel, the ambiguous valence of these 
characteristics abides; they arise from deprivation and lack and, as 
they point to morbidity, they simultaneously release sensations of a 
pre-reflective amplitude of being.
As it is beyond the scope of this article to argue the case of Michael 
K as a post-humanist novel (Atwell 1993: 97), one could suggest that 
it offers a critique of ideas of separateness, self-possession, identity, 
the unity of the subject, and discretely measured controlled time. It 
likewise questions the control we believe we have over our bodies, 
thoughts and will, our lack of communion with the being of plants, 
animals and even mineral life, and the suppression of the longing for 
death as a final ‘home’.
Michael K’s ‘pathological’ sensations of becoming-other are 
formulated in understated poetic language which, through an 
incremental metaphorical layering, gathers conceptual weight. Coetzee 
uses literalisation of the meaning of ordinary words as a technique 
that forces functional language into poetic conceptualisation. 
A particularly startling example of this is the literalisation of the 
words “dim” and “benighted” (Coetzee 1983: 54). These terms used 
descriptively for Michael K’s passive mental state are later refashioned 
to depict the idiot figure as a shamanic twilight hunter-gatherer, a 
genius-being of obscurity who reads the dark landscape and finds his 
way at night through “the pressure of presences upon his eyeballs and 
the skin of his face” (Coetzee 1983: 158).
What wrenches the heart of the reader all along is that s/he 
knows that Michael K is no wizard equipped with sweet magic realist 
faculties, no eco-critical prophet with a green agenda, but an outcast 
who is grovelling as best he can towards a place where he can finally 
come to rest.
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7.2 Existential features: the abject re-included
If Coetzee the writer is part philosopher, he certainly, with this 
character, uncovers original modalities of existence. The author selects 
subtle forms of integrity for his character; a personal fate privately 
and stubbornly appropriated and persistence in marginality. In his 
depiction of the effects of starvation, such as feelings of weakness, 
paralysis and semi-comatose or delirious periods, Coetzee maintains 
a convincing layer of fictive realism in his character, while equipping 
him with a visionary steadfastness in death.
Death for Michael K, however, is not suicide, the well-known 
nihilist-existentialist exit option – his author has in mind something 
much more radical. Coetzee designs for his character a conscious living 
of death in detail, in obscurity and without skipping a beat, a hundred 
per cent forsaken and infinitely self-forsaking. Rarely has there been 
a novelistic character embodying so acutely the notion of life as a 
“temptation to exist”, to speak with Cioran (1956/1968). At the same 
time, the author takes great care to mount in his character discrete 
and intense, wholly unpremeditated gestures of care, spontaneous 
nurturing and protection, evoking the Heideggerian register of care 
as an existential. Michael K tends his mother, his pumpkins and 
children, and a wounded man who crosses his path with instinctive 
protectiveness (Coetzee 1983: 98, 90, 124, 132, 155). It is also in this 
salvaging of a minimum caring community that the author fashions 
the closing scenes of the book, where Michael, having found signs of 
habitation in his mother’s former hovel under the stairs, dreams of 
companionship with a little old man who will return with him to the 
farm where they will exist on teaspoons of water drawn from a well. 
That the author is offering a death fantasy, rather than a glimmer of 
hope that Michael will survive, seems to me corroborated by the logic 
of withdrawal that motorises the entire narrative.
The consistent references to the bliss of passivity, the peace of 
sleep, the loosening of the grip of consciousness, the yielding up to 
time and oblivion seduce the reader by the existential truth that death 
essentially belongs to life (Coetzee 1983: 113). Slowly, in the course of 
the novel, the notion that life, as suffering, might of all things mostly 
desire death, is validated (Coetzee 1983: 93, 171). Therefore, if there 
is no “will to power” in Michael K, then neither is he comparable 
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to Nietzsche’s instrumental puppet Zarathustra on an emblematic 
mountaintop in an emblematic midday swoon: “But all joy wants 
eternity, wants deep, deep, deep eternity!” (Nietzsche 1969: 333).
In addition to fixing the longing for eternity in psychologically 
recognisable states of vertigo, related to physical depletion, Coetzee 
also takes care not to idealise death as a beatific transportation. 
The novel’s insistence rather is on the abject, the slow eruption of 
the corpse right under its owner’s still living eye, the waning of the 
flesh, the morbid bowel, the slowing of the heartbeat, the leaking 
of fluids, the diminishing body temperature and the dissolution of 
mental coherence (Coetzee 1983: 242). This character, however, is no 
political fasting hero; he is a casualty of the state, one of the many lives 
that the state and society simply rubbish when they cannot enslave 
him to its economy or have finished exploiting him, an insight that 
Michael K verbalises in one of his few speeches about his own mother 
(Coetzee 1983: 186). The difference, in this instance, is that Michael 
K succumbs to this fate but for ‘reasons’ that he steadfastly, in the 
midst of this suffering, erects as his own. This ambiguous death 
fundamentally challenges our defensive perceptions concerning 
finitude and mortality; it provides a violation of our sentimental life-
prioritising sensibilities, but it also critically suggests a scandalously 
South African ars moriendi.
7.3 Peregrinations in search of a place called ‘home’: 
another type of allegory of writing?
The elusiveness of Coetzee’s main character is concretised in the 
dynamics of radical withdrawal. He is a true athlete of retreat (Deleuze 
& Guattari 1994: 172). He absconds from every space, place or 
circumstance that limits or incarcerates him while falsely presenting 
itself as a ‘home’ – internment camps, hospitals, and schools. All of 
these fake homes manifest an institutional rationality of ‘care’ and 
‘protection’; all of them are regimes intent on keeping people alive. The 
novel reads like a litany of a dying man’s efforts of escaping, retreating, 
bolting, slipping off, tiptoeing away (from the city under martial law, 
from concentration camps, from the prison clinic), roaming out to 
the most barren and desolate area of the country, fastening on a 
deserted farm, minimising traces of his existence, covering his tracks, 
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camouflaging his dwelling, diminishing his stature, hiding and 
skulking in bushes, under culverts, in hovels and ruins, hibernating 
in his burrow and finally retreating for his final sleep into a spandrel 
space under a staircase, feeding to the last fluttering of consciousness 
a dream of another retreat into the countryside.
The dynamic of withdrawal that constitutes the narrative’s spatial 
sequences seems to fit the idea of plot developed by Brooks (1992): 
the erotic desire of the reader to follow metonymically the twists and 
turns of the plot, to read “for the end” is subtended by the desire for 
closure and (metaphoric) resolution, which, according to Brooks, can 
be conceived of as a parallel of the death instinct, the drive of living 
matter to return to the “quiescence of the inorganic, a state prior to 
life” (Brooks 1992: 51-2).
The deliberate repetition at the beginning and end of the novel of 
the metaphor of the teaspoon, the implement with which his mother 
feeds her hare-lipped baby, to Michael K’s death fantasy of drawing up 
water from a well shaft with a teaspoon on a string (Coetzee 1983: 245), 
illustrates Brooks’ conception of the dynamic interplay in any plot 
between metonymic and metaphoric dimensions. While the former, 
according to Brooks, is aligned with the pleasure principle (in the 
form of plot-bound narrative postponement), the latter coincides 
with the death drive (in the form of narrative closure) (Brooks 1992: 
29). Of course, in Coetzee, these dimensions are often conflated, 
the plot points realised in metaphor, the metaphors strung up in 
sequences.
In the dynamism of constant withdrawal, Michael K is 
conceptualised as an instance of the reluctance of organisms to 
enter the suffering, the oscillation/rhythmic dilations of life, and 
of their tendency, after a period of postponement, towards stasis 
and oblivion. One could suggest that, in this sense, Life and times of 
Michael K could be an allegory of all biological life and, therefore, 
all suffering, relativising the exceptional status attributed by human 
beings to human life and suffering. Coetzee’s subsequent concern 
with the lives of animals can certainly already be detected in this novel 
from the frequent references to Michael K as a snail, a hare, a mole 
and many references to the dumbness and vacancy with which beasts 
suffer their lot.
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7.4 Juridical features: vulnerability as conscience and 
critique of the law
Insofar as he is always found guilty by his persecutors, arrested by 
soldiers and deterred in institutions of discipline and punishment, 
the figure of Michael K is set up by the author as an interrogation of 
justice in a situation of war. As a ragged man rising from the earth, 
a ghost, a burrower, an insect man, a stone, Michael K personifies 
something even beyond ‘original innocence’. Yet the fact of his 
denuded and harmless existence qualifies him as legally undesirable by 
martial law. He is labelled an illegal loiterer, a waif without permanent 
abode, a non-entity lacking references or identification; he represents, 
in current terms, a true embodiment of the sans papiers, expiated from 
a war-ravished area, and on that basis alone, inexhaustibly punishable 
and punished by law. Coetzee sets up the desperately compromised 
camp doctor responsible for Michael K’s physical rehabilitation to 
declare him a prophetic conscience of war, its walls and fences, its 
rules, drills and prisoner categories. “I am not in the war”, Michael K 
says simply, rejecting this grand role (Coetzee 1983: 189).
If war is the direct cause of Michael K’s flight into the countryside, 
his wasted body holds another more general indictment; it can be 
considered a literalisation of the human ‘waste’ produced by the 
voracious state. Fired from his lowly post as municipal gardener, 
rejected by the urban economy, rubbished and subsequently punished 
for being rubbish, Michael K’s story is one of the double extinction 
often suffered by the lowest classes at the hands of capitalism.
Coetzee carefully sets up his character as judge of what Lemaire 
(2010) would call the “Promethean” values of Western capitalist 
society: the values of excessive striving under regimes of “self-
betterment”, self-punitive discipline, regular work in clocked up 
time, private property, the deep exploitation of the soil for profit, 
the falseness of overly principled and rigid thinking in the field of 
practical morality, and the mind/body duality, to name but a few. 
In a clear reference to the chapter in his book White writing (1988b) 
that deals with the European rejection of the ‘idleness’ of indigenous 
peoples, Coetzee elevates Michael K’s idleness to the natural state 
of the human being. He depicts him, formerly easily at a loss for 
things to do, entering into an alternative rapturous relationship with 
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time, where nothing needs to be done. The passage is worth quoting 
at length as it illustrates how prose ‘thinks’ abstract concepts in 
imaginative experiential language:
But most of all as summer slanted to an end, he was learning to love 
idleness, idleness no longer as stretches of freedom reclaimed by 
stealth here and there from involuntary labour, surreptitious thefts 
to be enjoyed sitting on his heels before a flowerbed with the fork 
dangling from his fingers, but as a yielding himself up to time, to a 
time flowing slowly like oil from horizon to horizon over the face 
of the world, washing over his body, circulating in his armpits and 
his groin, stirring his eyelids. He was neither pleased nor displeased 
when there was work to do, it was all the same. […] He was living 
beyond the reach of calendar and clock in a blessed neglected corner, 
half-awake half asleep. Like a parasite dozing in the gut, he thought, 
like a lizard under a stone (Coetzee, 1983: 158).
The modes in which the character Michael K slowly acquires the 
conceptual status of judge are, as exemplified in the passage quoted 
above, less modes of argument or dialogue than those of reverie and 
ecstasy. These are the states redolent with “percepts” and “affects” of 
languor and rapture which undermine the reader’s prejudices towards 
the abject outsider and censorious social perceptions of the lazy man, 
the irregular, and the homeless.
The concept of the judge is released poignantly when Michael 
K turns his very subjection to punishment into an opportunity for 
freedom, turning its strictures quietly and invisibly against itself. 
The following passage once again illustrates how Coetzee manages 
to cultivate ambiguity in passages of metaphoric saturation. In this 
instance, the punished schoolboy turns into the Buddha of Prince 
Albert, a godforsaken town in the South African semi-desert known 
as the Karoo.
Often in the course of his retreats into the wilderness he slacks into a 
posture, eyes closed and hands on his head, once forced upon him as 
punishment in the school classes of his youth, and which already as 
a young boy grew to lose its meaning as punishment and became an 
avenue of reverie; […] Now in front of his cave, he sometimes locked 
his fingers behind his head, closed his eyes, and emptied his mind, 
wanting nothing, looking forward to nothing (Coetzee 1983: 94).
A judge of war through non-participation, a judge of labour through 
idleness, a judge of striving through passiveness, and still the 
conceptual options for erecting a human norm that opposes the law 
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are not exhausted. Once again, it is through metaphors of body that 
Coetzee fashions Michael K into a judge of his own death sentence. 
The moment comes when, during Michael K’s last days, strung along 
in the company of prostitutes, a bottle of alcohol is passed to him. 
Through evoking Ode to Nightingale in the Keatsian cadence of: “A 
languor spread from his heart, bringing a blessed numbness to his 
head” (Coetzee 1983: 243), Coetzee, in a surprising move, through 
the association of hemlock, evokes the self-chosen death of none less 
than Socrates. Through his ugliness, poverty, non-conformist and 
‘out of place’ behaviour, Socrates constituted a radical questioning 
and judgement of the self-assured Athenian jury that condemned him 
to death. Accused of impiety and corrupting the youth, he slipped in 
the end from the confines of the state, performing his own death in 
an act of self-release from the suffering that life is, leaving his judges, 
like formerly his interlocutors, in a state of moral doubt (Hadot 
2005: 69-79).
It suffers reiteration, in this instance, that Michael K’s death is 
not portrayed as an ironic Socratic suicide, or any other favourite 
existentialist or stoic option of self-termination, but something much 
more radical: a living of death to the quick, in total desolation, with 
refined awareness of all the stages up to the last evanescent wafts 
of consciousness. Coetzee offers the pathic-existential features of 
Michael K that condition his relational, dynamic and juridical 
features as an extreme ethical experiment, one that erects a fictive 
foil, against which the reader can assess ‘normal’ options available to 
him-/herself as a compliant subject of the state. In this sense, the novel 
itself functions through its main character as a conceptual maieutic, a 
Socratic questioning of the effects of physical and structural violence 
sanctioned by state laws.
The outrage and condemnation that befell Coetzee’s novel in the 
1980s was mainly provoked by a White author’s depiction of a Black 
man as a powerless handicapped idiot lacking the motivation to fight 
his oppressors. Hardly any of the novel’s ethical torque could be truly 
acknowledged during the initial moments of reception. In a sense, one 
could speak of this novel as a “spandrel” of fiction. It will probably 
often lie dormant for certain periods until, through the violence of 
new local or global developments, it is rediscovered as an instrument 
of divination. There is no doubt in my mind that this novel would 
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still be found subversive by the current South African Department 
of Arts and Culture. It only needs to be pointed out to them that 
millions in South Africa are still ‘Michael K’d’ into ‘superfluousness’, 
left to perish in the squalor of poverty – this time not through the 
bureaucratically ordered fascism of an apartheid government, but 
through the fascism of wilful neglect practised by a governing elite in 
the name of a constitutional democracy.
7.5 Relational features: autonomy and moral 
pragmatism
If the law is of the father and sows division, separation and 
fragmentation, who is the mother and what does she stand for in this 
novel? Coetzee answers this question in terms of Michael K’s relational 
features. The question with which he has battled since his childhood, 
“Why was I born”, becomes revealed to him when his mother turns 
ill: “he had been born to look after his mother” (Coetzee 1983: 8); he 
understands. He has no relationships with other women, he does not 
attach to people generally, and he remains, however grateful for small 
kindnesses, indifferent to their charity. His main relationship is with 
his garden, his pumpkin plants, which he regards as his children, with 
the earth, its water and its nurturing capacities that are all extensions 
of his mother whose ashes he had dug into his garden as a starter pack 
of ritual compost:
He thought of the pumpkin leaves pushing through the earth. 
Tomorrow will be their last day, he thought: the day after that they 
will die, while I am out here in the mountains. Perhaps if I started 
at sunrise and ran all day I would not be too late to save them, them 
and the other seeds that are going to die underground, though they 
do not know it, that are never going to see the light of day. There was 
a chord of tenderness that stretched from him to the patch of earth 
beside the dam and must be cut. It seemed to him that one could cut 
a chord like that only so many times before it would not grow again 
(Coetzee 1983: 90).
The relations into which Michael K enters are so tentative as to forego 
any guarantee of permanence of progeny. Not even his brothers and 
sisters, as he calls his pumpkins and melons, provide him with a sense 
of continuity; their seeds are scattered from the packet onto which he 
holds until the end. Coetzee uses the issue of Michael K’s relations 
with people, animals and plants to offer an ethics of independence, a 
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Tao of being careful as doves and clever as snakes, dismissing everyday 
notions of principled helpfulness, support and charity, as well as 
the icy male heroics of comradeship. Rejected with great finality is a 
relationship with anybody who would try to fix him into a meaning 
or classify him into a category.
7.6 The conceptual figure and his conceptualiser: the 
novel as prison and escape hatch
In Life and times of Michael K, a White intellectual from the upper 
classes chooses as his character, as his man, a poor, presumably 
‘coloured’ handicapped man caught up in a war. This is who he makes 
into his ‘instrument’ of thinking and writing. As author and master 
of this character, he is the one who sets up his narrative confines, in 
camps and hospitals; he is the final warder and discipliner of Michael 
K; he starves him to death; he makes him faint with exhaustion; he 
is his torturer, his very sympathetic and extremely curious selfish 
torturer who wields this character’s emaciated body like a probe into 
the thickets of thinking about freedom and the freedom to choose 
death rather than compromising his own inclinations. If anybody 
has made Michael K into a body servant, it is Coetzee himself. How 
do you write about freedom with a good conscience when you have 
determined every move of your character?
We remember Coetzee’s Nobel Peace Lecture in which he 
philosophises, yet again by means of fiction, on the relationship 
between the author and his character, whom he refers to in this piece 
as “his man”.
How are they to be figured, this man and he? As master and slave? As 
brothers, twin brothers? As comrades in arms? Or as enemies, foes? 
What name shall he give this nameless fellow with whom he shares 
his evenings and sometimes his nights too, who is absent only in the 
daytime, when he, Robin, walks the quays inspecting the new arrivals 
and his man gallops about the kingdom making his inspections? 
(Coetzee 2003)
If we stand back and take up the clues of the distancing narrative style 
in Life and times of Michael K, and if we remember the escapes that 
Michael K makes time and again, we can ask whether Coetzee is not 
the kind of writer whom we can expect to fix an escape hatch for his 
character from the prison of the novel.
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And indeed he does; he writes a meta-fictional escape hatch in the 
shape of the camp doctor, a writer (albeit only of letters to Michael 
K) who makes a huge and obsessive effort to try and crack his ward 
and to get his story, his motives, his meaning out of him. In this way, 
Coetzee by proxy professes that he, the author himself, does not know 
what his character means, and that Michael K is the Other of writing, 
or maybe the Real, a non-human force erupting into fiction.
On the story level, Michael K remains his own person in refusing 
to be imprisoned in any way, either in the real camps or in the nets 
of meaning cast by the camp doctor who runs after him pleading 
for answers. Ultimately, we must agree with Atwell that Michael K 
symbolises the limited provisional freedom, not of any political 
nature, but of writing itself (Atwell 1993: 92). Coetzee does not tell 
us this; he stages these difficult self-reflexive meta-fictional concepts 
inside the narrative, as part of the story of his main character. The 
novel “presents us both with the story of K and with a struggle for 
control over the meaning of that story” (Coetzee 1983: 94). However, 
these two dimensions are not offered separately as a story and a 
commentary. Right up to the meta-fictional dregs, Michael K remains 
both a conceptual and a novelistic figure, a conceptual figure.
Could one conceive of Michael K as the sparring partner of the 
writer, a kind of alter ego, not in any superficial sense, but as a figure 
that is projected as transcendental Other or conditional Other to the 
writing process itself, the reluctant, elusive point of lack, or resistance, 
coaxed and lured and wrestled by the writer, yearned after, as the 
productive but finally hidden source of all new meanings?
I suggest that the power of this book has to do finally with how 
meaning is dependent on the inchoate and the ineffable, with how the 
discriminating mind is dependent on the unconscious, or as Deleuze 
& Guattari (1994: 118) would say, on chaos and the infinite speed of 
the virtual. Contact with this sphere is what writers live for and for 
which they are prepared to take considerable risks (Coetzee 1983: 
172). In these moments, their characters, as finite creatures, seem to be 
restored to infinity (Coetzee 1983: 197). In this instance, the risk goes 
even further; Coetzee tries consciously to write Michael K as silent 
and forever unspeaking, unyielding Other. He refuses, as an ethical 
writerly gesture, to be his master (Anker 2006). It is for this palpable 
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sense of risk, refusal and daring, the sense that immense forces are 
being wrestled with, that one can read this novel again and again and 
be moved without knowing exactly why. He is in us, this Other, this 
Michael K; he is, for lack of better words, what the soul wants.
8. Conclusion: a hard and a soft way of under-
standing the social responsibility of the writer
It could be that a South African writer like myself baulks at the formal 
mission formulations concerning the social role of the arts – precisely 
because she tends to understand them, perhaps wrongfully, in a strong 
prescriptive sense, which is the sense in which she got used to them – 
during the apartheid times (prescriptions from Afrikaner nationalists 
and their censors), during the struggle times (prescriptions from the 
Cultural Desk of the ANC), and during the post-apartheid times 
(prescriptions from the Department of Arts and Culture): artists 
should make artworks that are socially responsible, that is, their work 
should express clear messages of concern with a prescribed list of 
social values and ills and should, in unambiguous terms, promote a 
certain sensibility and ideals of social cohesion.
There is a second weaker sense in which the statement of the 
Centre for the Humanities could be read as far as literary fiction is 
concerned. One could take one’s cue from Appiah’s conception of 
narrative (as opposed to “reason”) as the innate practical capacity 
that “grounds our sharing” of life. What makes the cosmopolitan 
experience possible, according to this view, is our common “grasp of 
a narrative logic that allows us to construct the world to which our 
imaginations respond”, a common good which can be found “up 
the Amazon, the Mississippi, the Congo, the Indus and the Yellow 
rivers, just as it is found on the banks of the Avon or the Dordogne” 
(Appiah 2005: 257).
If taken in this weaker sense, one can read the mission brief quoted 
earlier as a simple invitation to talk with each other about books, 
music and pictures in the context of our times and to learn from and 
enrich each other’s interpretations and responses. This implies that 
a conversation without domination is possible between people from 
different cultures and that this would naturally and spontaneously 
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promote the kind of cosmopolitan society to which Europe’s cultural 
capitals aspire.
I have attempted, through an analysis of Coetzee’s text, to ground 
the intuition that conceptually ambiguous and linguistically ‘strange’ 
works that resist instrumental interpretations would best stimulate 
vitality in reading communities, simply because they will provoke 
tougher and more inconclusive conversations, and unpredictable 
interpretations. The ideas proposed in them could not be taken as 
advertisements for culture programmes. I would disagree with Appiah 
that ‘reason’ has no role in this case, that simply the spontaneous 
grasp of “narrative logic” is a prerequisite for communal sharing. I 
would like to imagine that a soft communicative universalism of the 
kind he proposes could be disciplined and challenged by the risky 
explorative reasoning of critical, ‘conceptual’ and writerly writers.
Where does all of this leave us? Recent austerity measures in 
Europe have hit the arts where it hurts. Right-wing denigration 
of the arts as a leftist hobby of the élite has added to the injury. 
Increasing pressure to sacrifice artistic autonomy to needs for 
‘communication’ and ‘cohesion’ betrays an urgency to pacify unruly 
elements and emasculate and co-opt critique of the status quo. Under 
such conditions, appreciation of the dissensus produced by serious 
works of art would be difficult to sell to ‘peace-makers’. Maybe the 
answer is in not trying to sell it. It might be time to start a samizdat 
where the voice of the “people to come” can be intoned (The Invisible 
Committee 2009), a voice shunning both the orthodoxy of opposition 
and the triumphalism of subversion, cultivating rather an authority 
of irrelevance when it comes to “cosmopolitan peace”. For whose 
“peace” would that be anyway? A “peace” towards what? Sponsored by 
whom? By those drilling in the arctic for gas? By those destroying the 
lives of people in the Niger Delta? Marginal artists are not the only 
ones recognising that, in the midst of fast traffic and shiny surfaces, 
history is again slowly erupting over the face of Europe. The thin 
silent ghost of Michael K is becoming visible on the streets of London, 
Paris and Utrecht – from down South these cities are indeed starting 
to resemble Johannesburg’s suburbs (Von Holt 2012: 4).
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